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Wallack: Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. 296 F.3D (9th Cir. 2002)

CASE SUMMARY

MATTEL, INC. V. MCA RECORDS, INC.
296 F.3D 894 ( 9 TH CIR. 2002)
I. INTRODUCTION

In Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled against Mattel, Inc., the maker
of the famous Barbie dolls and owner of the Barbie trademark,
concerning its claims of trademark use, confusion, dilution, and
unfair competition.' The Ninth Circuit affirmed the United States
District Court for the Central District of California decision
granting summary judgment in favor of music companies
associated with a band that used the word "Barbie" in a song.2 The
Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court's decision granting
summary judgment in favor of Mattel, Inc. concerning a
defamation claim asserted by the music companies.' In addition,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's holdings concerning jurisdictional claims made
by the music companies.4
II.BACKGROUND

In the spring of 1997, a Danish band named Aqua released a
song titled "Barbie Girl."5 This song and its music video included
lyrics to which Mattel, Inc. ("Mattel") objected.'
The band
1. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1125 (C.D. Cal
1998).
6. Id. at 1126.
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presented the song as if Barbie and Ken (the male companion to
Barbie) sang the lyrics.7 The Barbie character sang lyrics which

included, "undress me everywhere," "I'm a blond bimbo girl, in a
fantasy world", "you can touch, you can play, if you say 'I'm
always yours," and "make me talk, do whatever you please, I can
act like a star, I can beg on my knees."8 The Ken character sang
lyrics which included, "kiss me here, touch me there, hanky
panky" and "come jump in, bimbo friend, let us go do it again, hit
the town, fool around, let's go party."9 Mattel objected to the adult
themes intimated in the lyrics because they contradicted the
wholesome image Mattel promotes in connection with Barbie
dolls.' Mattel also asserted that the song was not about the doll,
therefore it could not be considered a parody."
In the fall of 1997, Mattel sued the record companies connected
to the "Barbie Girl" song, namely, MCA Records, Inc., Universal
Music International Ltd., Universal Music A/S, MCA Music
Scandinavia AB, and Universal Music & Video Distribution, Inc.
("MCA"). 2 Mattel sought a preliminary injunction to halt
production and distribution of the "Barbie Girl" song and video
based on claims of trademark infringement, unfair competition and
trademark dilution. 3 Mattel also wanted the United States District
Court for the Central District of California to order MCA to,
"dispose of or destroy any product or its packaging, which uses
Mattel's BARBIE trade name.'

14

In the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Mattel argued that MCA "misappropriated the Barbie
trademark by using the word 'Barbie' in a way that would confuse

7. Id. at 1137.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Mattel, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1126.
13. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., No. CV 97-6791-WMIB, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *4 (C.D. Cal. February 19, 1998).
14. Id.
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consumers and damage the Barbie product line.""5
MCA
responded by claiming the "Barbie Girl" song was a parody of an
American icon, and such parody receives protection under the First
Amendment. 6
MCA asserted, "the Barbie doll has become an icon that means
different things to different people."' 7 MCA stated that the doll
represented views at polar ends of spectrums concerning feminism,
chastity, and intelligence. Additionally, MCA noted that the doll
was both praised and criticized for her physical image. 8 MCA
also identified nine other songs that used the Barbie name in
connection with lyrics that were much more indecent then those in
Aqua's "Barbie Girl."' 9
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California adopted the view that the song was, "intended as a
parody of both the doll itself and the values she has come to
represent.""z The court also recognized that the members of the
band did not physically resemble Barbie and Ken dolls.2' The
court acknowledged that while the set of the video might be
reminiscent of Barbie accessories, such a set was compatible with
the band's intended use of the song as parody.'
When Mattel argued that the song infinged upon the Barbie
federal trademark, trade name and trade dress, and caused
consumer confusion, MCA responded that the trademark rights of
Mattel were not so expansive to reach a song that parodied
Mattel's product.'
The United States District Court for the
Central District of California recognized the Barbie doll as
distinctive, having acquired "secondary meaning."24 - However, the

15. Id. at *6.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at*11.
Mattel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *11.
Id. at*11-12.
Id. at *4 n.4.
Id. at*10.
Id.
Mattel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310 at *13-14.
Id. at *14-16.
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court noted that trademark rights are not limitless." The court
stated that trademark rights do "not allow trademark holders to
censor or silence all discussions of their products that they find
annoying or offensive." 6 The court cautioned that, "although the
First Amendment does not prevent trademark law from applying to
artistic works, courts must be careful not to trample on free speech
values in protecting trademarks. 2 7
While normally an eight-factor test is used to determine
likelihood of confusion concerning trademark infringement, MCA
asserted that their limited use of the word "Barbie" classified the
song "outside the trademark context."2 The United States District
Court for the Central District of California applied a three-point
test established in New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ'g,
Inc. to determine whether MCA could be a "commercial
user.. .entitled to a nominative fair use defense," and concluded
that MCA might have a defense to trademark infringement
claims. 9
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California determined that the song was a parody and therefore
was protected by the First Amendment." The court balanced the
First Amendment interest of MCA while considering the
traditional eight-factor likelihood of confusion test.3 ' The court
concluded that Mattel would not likely succeed in establishing
consumer confusion under the traditional test.32 Also, while the
court acknowledged that there may be some incidental confusion
because of the parody, it concluded that the First Amendment
25. Id.
26. Id. at *16.
27. Id. at* 16-17.
28. Mattel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310 at *17.
29. Mattel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310 at *4, *21-26, (C.D. Cal. February
19, 1998) citing New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d
302, 308 (9' Cir. 1992).
30. Id. at*31.
31. Id. at *32; AMF Inc. v. Sleekcrafi Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir.
1979).
32. Mattel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310 at *4, *46, (C.D. Cal. February 19,
1998).
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interests involved weighed against granting a preliminary
injunction.33
Next, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California addressed Mattel's claims of dilution. Mattel argued
that the "Barbie Girl" song tarnished the Barbie trademark since
the song implied adult themes in its lyrics that contradicted the
wholesome image Mattel promotes in connection with its Barbie
doll.34 MCA, however, reasoned that the song fell within the "noncommercial use of a mark" exception to the federal dilution
statute, and that First Amendment principles protected the use of
the Barbie trademark by MCA.35 The court recognized that even if
use of the word "Barbie" by MCA did not fall under the statutory
exception, the song was a parody, which enjoyed First Amendment
protection.36 The court concluded that unless Mattel could provide
more evidence of tarnishment, it would be unlikely to prevail on
its trademark dilution claims.37
After Mattel filed its lawsuit, Mattel and MCA exchanged words
publicly.38 MCA was upset over Mattel's characterization of
MCA's actions concerning the Barbie controversy. 39 MCA
responded to the comments made by Mattel by filing a
counterclaim for defamation.40
In February 1998, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California ultimately denied Mattel's motion for
a preliminary injunction.4' Subsequent to the February 1998
decision, MCA moved for summary judgment, and sought to
dismiss the foreign defendants over jurisdictional and forum
matters. 42 Also, Mattel moved for reconsideration of the denial of

33. Id.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at *48-49.
Id. at *49.
Id. at *52.
Id.
Mattel, 28 F. Supp. 2dat 1159.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1126.
Id.
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the preliminary injunction, and it moved for summary judgment to
dismiss MCA's defamation claims. 3
With regard to the jurisdictional and forum claims, MCA sought
to dismiss the foreign defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction,
subject matter jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens."
The
United States District Court for the Central District of California
concluded it had personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction,
and that the choice of forum by Mattel was appropriate.45
With regard to the defamation claim, MCA was disturbed by
comments made by Mattel. Mattel, in attempting to draw an
analogy to the actions of MCA related to the lawsuit, used terms
such as "bank robber," "heist," "crime," and "theft."46 The United
States District Court for the Central District of California
concluded that the statements made by Mattel were merely
"hyperbole made in the middle of an attempt to convince the
public of Mattel's' side in the ongoing litigation."47
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California recognized that there was additional protection for
statements made about a public figure, however, MCA claimed
that it was not a public figure.48 The court observed that voluntary
actions of MCA while trying to "thrust itself into the forefront of
the dispute with Mattel" enabled MCA to be considered a public
figure for the purposes of a related defamation action.49 Mattel and
MCA argued over the sufficiency of evidence to prove that malice
was present.5 0 The court concluded that MCA failed to meet its
high burden to prove its defamation claim against Mattel. 1
In August 1998, The United States District Court for the Central
District of California addressed the claim by Mattel of unfair
43. Mattel, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1126-32.

46. Id. at 1159.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1161.
Mattel, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
Id.
Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1164.
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competition under the Paris Convention.12 Mattel asserted that it
had a federal cause of action that was separate from those available
under the Lanham Act. 3 The court indicated that the Paris
Convention allowed foreign plaintiffs to assert federal causes of
action. 4 The court also recognized that, "the Paris Convention
does not create 'private rights under American law for acts of
unfair competition occurring in foreign countries,"' 5 so it did not,
"create substantive law distinct from the trademark law of
individual nations."56 The court concluded that to the extent that
Mattel was trying "to apply the Convention to the foreign
defendants' acts (in the United States), the Convention did not
create a separate cause of action distinct from those already
provided under federal law."57
Il. DISCUSSION

Both Mattel and MCA appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. MCA appealed two aspects of the
decision of the United States District Court for the Central District
of California. Its first appeal concerned the jurisdictional holdings,
and its second appeal concerned the granting of summary
judgment to Mattel regarding MCA's defamation claim.58
Mattel appealed four aspects of the decision of the United States
District Court for the Central District of California: (1) there was
no likelihood of confusion concerning use of the word "Barbie" by
the named music companies; (2) the song "Barbie Girl" was a
parody of Barbie and considered nominative fair use; (3) there was

52. Id. at 1159.
53. Mattel, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1157.
54. Mattel, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (quoting Maison Lazard Et Compagniev.
Manfra Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (S.D. N.Y. 1988)).
55. Mattel, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (quoting Contractors v. Santa Fe Int'l
Corp., 582 F. Supp. 445, 455 (C.D.Cal. 1984)) (quoting Vanity FairMills v. T.
Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 (2nd Cir. 1956)).
56. 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
57. Id. at 1158.
58. Id.
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no dilution concerning use of the word "Barbie" by the named
music companies; and (4) assertion of an unfair competition claim
under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property was not available to Mattel. 9
In July 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit denied the appeals of both Mattel and MCA, and affirmed
the holdings of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. °
A. JurisdictionalHoldings
There were two jurisdictional holdings at issue before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The first holding
concerned the personal jurisdiction over the foreign music
companies named as defendants, namely, Universal Music
International Ltd., Universal Music A/S, and MCA Music
Scandinavia AB.6 The court observed that these music companies
worked together to distribute and promote the "Barbie Girl" song
in the United States.6". The court recognized that the music
companies allegedly harmed Mattel in California, which was
Mattel's principal place of business.6" The court reasoned that the
intentional actions in the United States caused Mattel to file the
lawsuit. 4 The court noted the close relationships among all of the
defendants, foreign and domestic, and noted they were all
represented by the same counsel.6" The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the United States District
Court for the Central District of California decision to assert
personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendants. 6
The second jurisdictional holding concerned the jurisdiction of
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 899.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 899.
Id.
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the United States District Court for the Central District of
California under the Lanham Act." The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the international sales
of the album that included the "Barbie Girl" song sufficiently
impacted American foreign commerce, and those sales resulted in
Mattel experiencing monetary damages domestically. 8 The court
noted that the trademark infringement and dilution claims of
Mattel were related more to American foreign commerce than to
The court supported its position by
international commerce.'
noting that California was the principal place of business for
Mattel, that Mattel was only seeking relief concerning domestic
sales by MCA, and although there were foreign defendants, those
defendants had close relationships with the domestic defendants.7"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
concluded that extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Lanham Act
was proper.7"
B. Trademark

1.

Likelihood of Confusion

Mattel appealed the United States District Court for the Central
District of California's decision granting summary judgment
concerning Mattel's likelihood of confusion claim in favor of
MCA.72 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
instructed that a trademark is used as a source-identifier for
providers of goods and services.' It stated that since the purpose
of trademarks is very limited, "a trademark owner's property rights

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 899-900.
Id. at 900.
Id. at 899.
Id. at 900.
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play well with the First Amendment. ' 74 The court, however,
recognized that problems exist when, "trademarks transcend their
identifying purpose. 7 5 It noted that some trademarks have fallen
into the every-day vocabulary of the public, such as Band-Aid or
Aspirin, and when this happens, the trademark "assumes a role
outside the bounds of trademark law.

76

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
declared that it typically addressed a trademark issue concerning a
likelihood of consumer confusion by applying a test set forth in
AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats.77 The court said, however, that such
a test was not adequate to balance against, "the full weight of the
public's interest in free expression."78 The court recognized the
limits on trademark owners by indicating that they, "do not have
the right to control public discourse whenever the public imbues
his mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying function."79
The court addressed whether the "Barbie Girl" song was a parody
before ruling on the likelihood of confusion claim.
2. Parody and Fair Use

Mattel also appealed the United States District Court for the
Central District of California decision that the song Barbie Girl
was a parody of Barbie and considered nominative fair use.8" The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized
that while MCA obviously used the Barbie trademark in its
"Barbie Girl" song, the title described the underlying work,
namely, a song about Barbie or a girl similar to Barbie.8'
The song "Barbie Girl" made fun of Barbie and the values she

74. Id.
75. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900.

76. Id.
77. Id.; 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
78. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900.

79. Id.
80. Id. at 899.
81. Id. at 901.
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had come to represent to Aqua, the band singing the song.8" The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made the
distinction that "the song does not rely on the Barbie mark to poke
fun at another subject but targets Barbie herself."83 The court
distinguished the parody found in "Barbie Girl" from a book
entitled The Cat NOT in the Hat! that incorporated a protected
work of Dr. Seuss. The court recalled that in Dr. Seuss, it ruled
that "The Cat NOT in the Hat! borrowed Dr. Seuss's trademarks
and lyrics to get attention rather than to mock The Cat in the
Hat!", and as a result The Cat NOT in the Hat! was not afforded
First Amendment protection against trademark infringement.84
The Ninth Circuit recalled the Dr. Seuss court declaration that,
"where an artistic work targets the original and does not merely
borrow another's property to get attention, First Amendment
interests weigh more heavily in the balance.""5
With regard to a standard of review, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit looked to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit for guidance.86 The Second Circuit
recognized in Rogers v. Grimaldi that consumers, "do not regard
titles of artistic works in the same way as the names of ordinary
commercial products."87 In Rogers, actress Ginger Rogers
objected to a film entitled Ginger and Fred that involved two
dancers who imitated Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire. 8 She
argued that the public would mistakenly associate her with the
filmY. The Rogers court determined that the Lanham Act was not
violated by literary titles, "unless the title has no artistic relevance
to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic
relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the

82. Id.
83. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901
84. Id. at 901; Dr. Seuss Ents., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 'Inc., 109 F.3d
1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
85. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901.
86. Id.
87. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901 (quoting Rogers 875 F.2d 994, 999).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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content of the work." 90
In applying the Rogers standard to the case at hand, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized that use
of Barbie in the title "Barbie Girl" described the underlying
work. 9' While MCA used the Barbie mark, the song parodied
Barbie and the values she had come to represent to the band
singing the song. The court further recognized that the "Barbie
Girl" title "does not explicitly mislead as to the source of the work;
it does not, explicitly or otherwise, suggest that it was produced by
Mattel. ' 92
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the view that the "Barbie Girl" song was a parody in
nature.93 The court concluded that MCA was properly granted
summary judgment on the grounds concerning the likelihood of
confusion.
3. Dilution
Mattel appealed the United States District Court for the Central
District of California ruling that there was no dilution concerning
use of the word "Barbie" by the named music companies. 94 Mattel
argued that under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, the "Barbie
Girl" song diluted the Barbie mark in two ways.95 First, it claimed
that the song, "diminishes the mark's capacity to identify and
distinguish Mattel products." 96 Second, it claimed the song,
"tarnishes the mark because the song is inappropriate for young
girls."97 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
contrasted dilution and trademark infringement by stating, "the
injury from dilution usually occurs when consumers aren't
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 902 (quoting Rogers 875 F.2d 994, 999).
Id. at 901.
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 899.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902-03.
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confused about the source of a product."9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
discussed the significance of the adoption of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act in 1996."9 The court identified that the
Act offered statutory protection for, "the owner of a famous
mark.. .against another person's commercial use in commerce of a
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
I0 0
mark."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recognized use of the Barbie trademark by MCA as dilutive since
the Barbie mark was famous and MCA participated in commerce
for its own gain with goods that identified the same Barbie mark.'0
The court highlighted the evidence of blurring which took place
since the success of "Barbie Girl" song, in that consumers may
now associate the Barbie mark with more than just the doll.10 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted
that while dilutive use of trademarks is prohibited, there are three
statutory exceptions to this rule.0 3 These exceptions include
comparative advertising, news reporting and commentary, and
noncommercial use.0 4 The court applied the third exception
concerning noncommercial use, and noted that the other two
categories were inapplicable to the case.'0 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reconciled its finding that there was commercial use of the "Barbie
Girl" song under the first part of the statute concerning the
determination of dilution, with its subsequent evaluation of
whether the song fell under a noncommercial use exception.'

98. Id. at 903.

99. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996), see e.g. 296 F.3d at 903.
100. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
101. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903.
102. Id. at 903-04.
103. Id. at 904.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 904.
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The court sought to interpret the statute in a manner that preserved
maximum First Amendment protection for dilutive speech
10 7
provided in the statute.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
differentiated trademark injunctions from dilution injunctions. It
first addressed the scope of the injunctions. The court stated a
trademark injunction is usually very narrow in scope since it
addresses the confusion concern in one or a few industries,
whereas a dilution injunction is much broader since it addresses
the association of the mark with unrelated goods and services.0 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also
contrasted the purpose of trademark injunctions and dilution
injunctions.
It recognized that consumer protection is a
consideration with a trademark injunction, which is consistent with
the First Amendment, and not a consideration for a dilution
injunction.0 9 The court acknowledged that, "dilution law protects
only the distinctiveness of the mark, which is inherently less
weighty than the dual interest of
protecting trademark owners and
0
' 1
consumers."
to
harm
avoiding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
referred to the legislative history of the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act for guidance in resolving its dilemma."' The court
noted that Congress was cognizant of "the potential collision with
the First Amendment if the statute authorized injunctions against
protected speech.""'
As a result, Congress trusted that the
"noncommercial use" exception would alleviate the First
Amendment concerns."' The "noncommercial use" as used in the
statutory exception, therefore "refers to a use that consists entirely
of noncommercial, or fully constitutionally protected, speech.""' 4
107. Id.
108. Id. at 904-05.

109. Id. at 905.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905.
Id.
Id. at 906.
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit then
evaluated whether the 'arbie
Girl" song qualified under the
"noncommercial use" exemption by reviewing its prior decisions
concerning commercial speech and the First Amendment." 5 The
court recalled a statement made in its prior decision of Hoffman v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., that, "if speech is not purely
commercial.. .if it does more than propose a commercial
transaction-then it is entitled to full First Amendment
Protection."1 6
In Hoffman, a magazine promoted itself by altering images of
popular films, including an image of the actor Dustin Hoffman in
his role in the film "Tootsie.... 7 The image was altered so that he
appeared to be dressed in current high fashion.1 8 Dustin Hoffman
sued under the Lanham Act and for violation of his right to
publicity since he had not provided permission for such use. 9 In
Hoffman, the Ninth Circuit decided that although the purpose of
the subject work was commercial, it incorporated expression, so it
was therefore protected under the First Amendment.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied
its holding in Hoffman to the case at hand.' 2 ' The court concluded
that similar to the image in the magazine in Hoffinan, the "Barbie
Girl" song was protected since it "lampoons the Barbie image and
comments humorously on the cultural values Aqua claims she
represents."'"
The "song, therefore, was considered
noncommercial use and an exception to the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act."

115. Id. at 906.
116. Id. at 906 (citing Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180,

1185-86 (9th Cir. 2001)).
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906-07.
Id. at 907.
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Unfair Competition Claim

Mattel appealed the United States District Court for the Central
District of California assertion that an unfair competition claim
against the foreign defendants under the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property was not available to Mattel.' 24
Mattel claimed that an article under the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property created "a federal cause of action
for unfair competition in international disputes and that Section 44
of the Lanham Act makes the substantive provisions of the Paris
' 25
Convention available to United States nationals."'
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clarified issues that
were identified in Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.'26 In Toho, a
foreign national was protected against unfair competition under
section 44 of the Lanham Act. 27 Provisions under section 44
allowed this protection to the foreign national since its country of
origin was a signatory to a trademark convention or treaty that the
United States also signed. The court noted that "the only
protection under unfair competition that subsection 44(h) granted
to foreign nationals, and subsection 44(i) therefore grants to
American citizens, is that which is, 'necessary to give effect to any
2
provisions of [trademark treaties]."1 1
The court recalled its holding in Kemart Corp v. PrintingArts
Research Labs, Inc. where the Paris Convention was not found to
have defined substantive law concerning unfair competition as it
related to the countries which signed the Convention. 29 The Paris
Convention instead leveled the playing field to ensure an equality
of treatment of parties by member countries. 3 ' The court
concluded that the Paris Convention did not provide Mattel with
more protections against foreign nationals than it had against
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 899.
Id. at 907.
645 F.2d 788, 790-92 (9th Cir. 1981).
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 907.
Id. at 908; 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b).
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 908; 269 F.2d 375, 389 (9th Cir. 1959).
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 908.
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American nationals.' 3 ' The Ninth Circuit clarified that it was
treating Mattel "like a foreign national, who is treated like an
American under the Paris Convention,"' 13 2 and concluded that
Mattel had "no claim to a nonexistent federal cause of action."'3
C. Defamation
MCA appealed the United States District Court for the Central
District of California's decision granting summary judgment
concerning MCA's defamation claim in favor of Mattel.'34 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered
Mattel's use of terms such as "bank robber," "heist," "crime," and
"theft" to describe the actions of MCA.'35 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized that use of such terms
was just a substitute for Mattel claiming piracy by MCA.'36 The
court observed that "no one hearing this accusation understands
intellectual property owners to be saying that infringers are
nautical cutthroats with eyepatches and peg legs who board
galleons to plunder cargo," ' and went on to describe use of such
terms by Mattel as "nonactionable rhetorical hyperbole."' 38 The
court therefore affirmed the United States District Court for the
Central District of California decision granting summary judgment
in favor of Mattel, Inc. concerning the defamation claim.
IV. Conclusion
Ruth Handler, the creator of the Barbie doll and co-founder of
Mattel, launched Barbie into the toy market in 1959.2" When she
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.

134. Id. at 899.
135. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 908.

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 908 (quoting Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 863
(9th Cir. 1999)).

139. Barbie

Doll

Creator

Dies,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/1956180.stm.
12, 2002).
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did so, she created not just a toy but a cultural icon. Although its
creator passed away in April, 2002,140 the Barbie doll and its
trademark will undoubtedly continue. As the doll and trademark
endure, however, Mattel is informed of the limits on how far it can
go with claiming trademark rights when the First Amendment is
involved, as established by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. 4 '
Heather Wallack

140. Id. (Ruth Handler was forced out of Mattel in the late 1970's).
141. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906.
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